Making relocation easier. Is this a positive trend?

In a continuing stream of court opinions that appear to make it easier for a custodial parent to relocate outside the borders of New Jersey with the children, an unreported decision remanded a relocation case back to the trial judge so that a plenary hearing could be held. Such a hearing was necessary given the competing factual allegations in the certifications submitted by each party. The trial court judge originally decided to deny the relocation request because the proposed move would have had an unacceptably negative impact on the father’s parenting time. While I disagree with the tone of this decision, it signifies a shift in the law.

FAMILY LAW
20-2-8964 Loos v. Brown, App. Div. (per curiam) (6 pp.) The appellate panel reverses a family judge’s determination — reached without benefit of an evidentiary hearing and in the face of competing certifications — that prohibited the primary custodial parent’s (mother) removal of the parties’ child from New Jersey to North Dakota. In denying relief, the trial judge placed too much weight on the impact removal would have on the father’s rights and interests. The judge should not have assigned weight to any of the circumstances contained in the parties’ competing certifications because the facts were largely disputed. The judge should have recognized that the mother had satisfied the burden of presenting a prima facie case, placing the burden of going forward on the father to “produce evidence opposing the move as either not in good faith or inimical to the child’s interest.” Once the mother presented a prima facie case, the judge should have scheduled an evidentiary hearing to resolve the parties’ many factual disputes. The panel remands for an evidentiary hearing.

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Court eases burden for a parent seeking to relocate out of NJ with the children

In today’s mobile society   in which both parents work it has become increasingly likely that the custodial parent may need t relocate outside of New Jersey.    Generally, the custodial parent cannot move out of New Jersey without the consent of the other parent or a court order permitting the move.  The case of Baures v. Lewis sets forth the criteria the court is to consider when deciding the issue.  One of the factors is whether the moving parent can establish a good faith reason for the move.  One good faith reason has been a new job.  In a recently decided case it was held that actually having the new job is not required; simply identifying that the prospects for better employment exists can be sufficient.

 

FAMILY LAW
20-4-8952 Benjamin v. Benjamin, Ch. Div., Family Pt. — Ocean Co. (Jones, J.S.C.) (11 pp.) Having another job in place is not a prerequisite for a custodial parent wishing to relocate with a child to another state, but the likelihood of being able to establish a financially stable household is a relevant factor in considering a relocation application. [Decided Oct. 19, 2012.] [Approved for publication.]

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NJ Alimony Reform: My 2 Cents.

I am a NJ divorce lawyer. I work day in and day out to help individuals and there children through the divorce process.  I often get blamed for causing divorce.  The collective integrity of my colleagues is constantly under attack.  I am accused of making divorce a nasty fight simply to line my own pockets. I can deal with these misplaced assaults because I am assured of the positive impact my colleagues and I can have on our fellow New Jerseyeans as they face one of life’s biggest challenges.

 I write this letter to in order to address a growing movement with respect to alimony that if allowed to gain traction will hurt women and children, strip the courts of their equitable authority, and eviscerate our fundamental notion of fairness.  The call for alimony guidelines is growing louder and louder each day.  If that call goes unchecked, the consequences could be catastrophic.  Couched in terms of consistency, efficiency and guidance, alimony guidelines would apply a cookie cutter approach to a deeply personalized analysis that is unique from family to family. 

 Alimony guidelines represent an overly broad solution to a “problem” identified by an agenda driven constituency.  Let’s be clear:  despite the rhetoric, the proposed alimony reforms benefit the moneyed spouse.  Proponents of alimony guidelines cannot argue otherwise.  The imposition of guidelines are strict time limits on how long one can receive alimony will create economic havoc.

 There is some merit to the arguments that we, attorneys and litigants, could benefit from a higher degree of consistency in alimony decisions.  I am not opposed to this notion.  However, I am opposed to the implementation of any method that creates an inequitable result, ignores our statutes and case law, and frankly, rewards lazy lawyering.  Rather than impose blanket guidelines which ignore the individuality of each family facing divorce, refine the statute, return cases to the court room where our time honored tradition of stare decisis can develop the existing body of case law. Mediation and arbitration are denying the public the benefit learning from prior cases. Lawyers who fail to develop, analyze and present the facts do a disservice to the client.

 Judges should hold lawyers accountable for articulating facts that pertain to the statutory factors. Attorneys need to hold judges accountable for making findings of fact that support the alimony award.

 Formulas are easy to implement and allow for lazy lawyering. Reducing the living, breathing clients to a plot on a graph denies them the individualized attention they deserve.

 Justice should remain blind by not imposing preconceived notions of equity on litigants. Blindness does not require a refusal to examine the particular facts and intentions of the parties.

 If we as family law practitioners turn a blind eye to this growing threat to justice our clients will be left in the dark.

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Finding of ongoing need for protection required for entry of Final Restraining Order

A recent unreported Appellate Division decision highlights an important component of the analysis required to determine if a Domestic Violence Restraining Order is necessary in a particular case. Court are called upon to determine when routine domestic squabbles cross the line and constitute domestic violence. When deciding if a final restraining order is warranted the judge must consider whether or not the alleged victim requires the ongoing protections available to them under the terms of a restraining order. The trial court’s decision to not enter a restraining order was based on the belief that the plaintiff’s testimony was not credible and that both parties failed to establish a legitimate need for ongoing protection. Domestic Violence is never acceptable and those who commit domestic violence should bear responsibility for their actions. However, the consequences of having an FRO entered against you can be severe so they should not be granted lightly. This case strives to achieve an appropriate balance

 

FAMILY LAW
20-2-8833 E.M.Y. v. D.Y., App. Div. (per curiam) (5 pp.) Plaintiff E.M.Y. appeals from the decision dismissing the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) she obtained pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. The parties were married in 1985 and have two children. In March 2010, defendant D.Y. served E.M.Y. with a divorce complaint. The couple continued to live together in separate rooms in the marital home. In May 2011, both parties were granted TROs as a result of a physical altercation at their home. Each sought a Final Restraining Order (FRO). Both parties and their older son testified at trial and both parties were represented by counsel. The trial judge found neither party had met his or her burden of proof to obtain an FRO and vacated all restraints. He found plaintiff’s testimony not to be credible. The judge found both parties had entered into the other’s bedroom during the two confrontations. He found that although both parties sustained physical injuries, neither party had proven harassment or assault by a preponderance of the evidence as required for the issuance of an FRO pursuant to the Act. The judge also found that neither party could establish a legitimate protective need for an FRO. The appellate panel affirms substantially on the basis of the judge’s oral and written opinions.

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No right to appointed counsel in NJ Domestic Violence cases

As reported in the NJ Law Journal, litigants in family court domestic violence cases do not have a right to court appointed attorneys.  Given that the consequences of a domestic violence hearing can be significant – no matter what side of the case you may find yourself – retaining the right attorney is critical.  While the court found that the Domestic Violence Act, and the legislative intent behind the Act, does not provide for the appointment of counsel, it does all but require an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing plaintiff / victim as a form of compensatory damages.  If the defendant is succesful in defeating the request for a restraining order there is no allowance for their reasonable fees.

FAMILY LAW — DOMESTIC VIOLENCE — RIGHT TO COUNSEL
20-2-8805 D.N. v. K.M., App. Div. (Lihotz, J.A.D.) (25 pp.) In these back-to-back appeals of Family Part orders in two domestic-violence matters, we review whether there is a right to assigned counsel, and particularly, whether counsel should be appointed for indigent litigants presenting or defending domestic-violence complaints. We concluded the relief a court may grant and the remedies available under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, are curative. Therefore, the protections of due process do not require the appointment of counsel for indigents presenting or defending a private party’s civil domestic-violence action. Also, the Legislature did not intend to invoke the power of the state to prosecute civil requests for restraining orders. Rather, the act provides a plaintiff with a cause of action for civil relief for which there is no entitlement to assigned counsel.

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